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Criminal Intent and the Sherman Act: The
Label Per Se Can't Take Gypsum Away
By Thomas Patrick Sullivan*
In 1913, the United States Supreme Court confronted the
question of whether the imposition of criminal penalties under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act1 (Sherman Act) required a
showing of criminal intent. Upholding the conviction in United
States v. Patten,2 the Court rejected the defendant's contention
that specific intent must be proved, stating:
[No] allegation of a specific intent to restrain such trade or com-
merce [is required], for, as is shown by prior decisions of this
court, the conspirators must be held to have intended the neces-
sary and direct consequences of their acts and cannot be heard to
say the contrary. In other words, by purposely engaging in a con-
spiracy which necessarily and directly produces the result which
the statute is designed to prevent, they are, in legal contempla-
tion, chargeable with intending that result.3
The holding in Patten was generally interpreted not only as negat-
ing a requirement of specific intent in criminal antitrust cases,4 but
also as conclusively establishing that a defendant intends the nec-
essary and direct consequences of his or her actions.5
Sixty-five years after Patten, in United States v. United
* B.S., 1978, San Jose State University. Member, Third Year Class.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceed-
ing one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dol-
lars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court." Id.
2. 226 U.S. 525 (1913).
3. Id. at 543.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); United States v. Cham-
pion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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States Gypsum Co.,6 the Court reconsidered its historial interpre-
tation of section 1, holding that: "a defendant's state of mind or
intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which must be
established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and can-
not be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal pre-
sumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices."
'7
Gypsum appears to have implicitly overruled at least that por-
tion of the Patten decision which held that a defendant must be
taken to have intended the necessary and direct consequences of
his or her actions.8 The Supreme Court in Gypsum established a
two-pronged test to determine intent in section 1 criminal actions.
The first standard, to be applied when the defendant's conduct ac-
tually results in anticompetitive effects, requires that the govern-
ment prove that the conduct was undertaken with knowledge of its
probable consequences." The second standard, applicable in the
absence of anticompetitive effects, requires proof by the govern-
ment that the defendant acted with the conscious purpose of
bringing about the proscribed result.10
Despite these seemingly clear and categorical rules, several re-
cent appellate court decisions involving section 1 criminal of-
fenses" have relied on a different part of the Gypsum decision to
sustain convictions arrived at without a specific finding of intent. 2
In each case, the reason for distinguishing Gypsum announced by
the court was that the conduct it was examining, unlike the con-
duct in Gypsum, involved a per se violation of section 1.
This Note challenges the reasoning of these recent decisions,
and in particular the courts' use of the per se concept to circum-
vent the Gypsum mandate of proof of intent. The Note begins
with a review of the Supreme Court holding in Gypsum, including
6. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
7. Id. at 435.
8. Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1399 (1978). See also United
States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 549 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). Interestingly, only
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, makes any mention of Patten. See 438 U.S. at
475-76 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. 438 U.S. at 444.
10. Id. at 444 n.21.
11. See United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
12. For a discussion of that portion of the Gypsum decision relied on by the courts of
appeals, see notes 32-45 and accompanying text infra.
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a discussion of that portion of Chief Justice Burger's opinion that
has been interpreted as excepting per se violations of section 1
from the reach of the Gypsum standards. The Note then traces the
historical development of the per se concept and examines the
problems inherent in the per se approach. Lastly, the Note consid-
ers the function of the Sherman Act as a criminal statute and dis-
cusses the importance of a criminal intent requirement in light of
Congress' recent amendment to section 1 elevating violations to
the rank of felonies. The Note concludes that the basic unsound-
ness of the per se rules, coupled with the newly increased sanctions
for criminal convictions, makes the Gypsum requirement of proof
of intent mandatory in all section I criminal prosecutions.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
The defendants in Gypsum were six major manufacturers of
gypsum board and certain of their corporate officials. The govern-
ment's case at trial centered on the defendants' practice of
telephoning competing producers to determine the price currently
being offered on gypsum board to specific customers. The govern-
ment contended that this price verification between sellers had the
effect of stabilizing prices in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.13 The defendants responded to the allegations by claiming
that the exchanges of price information were necessary to enable
them (1) to take advantage of the "meeting competition" defense
contained in section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act" and (2) to
prevent customer fraud.15 The defendants argued that these pur-
13. 438 U.S. at 429.
14. Id. at 429 n.4. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976),
forbids price discrimination between purchasers of commodities of like grade or quality
where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, or
to injure, destroy or prevent competition. Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, id. §
13(b), provides that a seller may rebut a prima facie case of discrimination "by showing that
his lower price... was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor
... ." The defendants in Gypsum thus maintained that any exchanges of information that
took place were for the purpose of establishing good faith in granting price reductions to
specific buyers.
15. 438 U.S. at 429. The defendants' argument was that a buyer who is given a firm
price quotation by a supplier for a specified quantity of merchandise in order to protect him
or her against potential price increases during a construction project could misrepresent to
another supplier that such price protection had not been received and thereby obtain extra
supplies at a lower price. This argument was based on the holding in Cement Mfrs. Protec-
tive Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), that even if the information exchanged
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poses brought the case within a "controlling circumstance" excep-
tion to Sherman Act liability.16
The instructions given by the trial judge provided that the de-
fendants' purposes for exchanging prices were essentially irrelevant
if the jury found that the effect of the verification was to fix or
stabilize prices. 17 Using the language of Patten and its progeny,"8
the trial judge charged the jury that: "The law presumes that a
person intends the necessary and natural consequences of his acts
[and] if the effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to
raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties... are
presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended that result." ' Each
of the defendants was subsequently found guilty of violating sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.
A divided Third Circuit reversed the convictions on appeal"
The two judges who could agree on a common ground felt that if
the defendants' sole purpose in exchanging price information was
to establish a defense to price discrimination charges under the
Robinson-Patman Act, they would have established a "controlling
circumstance" which, under United States v. Container Corp. of
America,21 would excuse what might otherwise constitute an anti-
trust violation.22
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that an interseller
exchange of prices was necessary to establish a "meeting competi-
tion" defense under the Robinson-Patman Act.2s Nevertheless, the
tended to bring about uniformity in price, the defendants' good motive in guarding against
fraud in the execution of particular job contracts exempted them from Sherman Act liabil-
ity. See 438 U.S. at 448 & n.24.
16. In United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), the Supreme
Court refused to overrule its previous stance in Cement Manufacturers, despite apparent
rejection of the "good motive" defense. See note 15 supra. Instead, the Court elected to
distinguish the price exchange in Cement Manufacturers, stating: "While there was present
here, as in [Cement Manufacturers], an exchange of prices to specific customers, there was
absent the controlling circumstance, viz., that cement manufacturers ... exchanged price
information as a means of protecting their legal rights from fraudulent inducements to de-
liver more cement than needed for a specific job." 393 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added). See
generally Note, United States v. United States Gypsum Co.: Putting a Lid on Container,
45 BROoa-rYN L. Rlv. 417, 429 (1979).
17. 438 U.S. at 429-30.
18. See cases cited in notes 4-5 supra.
19. 438 U.S. at 430.
20. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
21. 393 U.S. 333 (1969). See note 16 supra.
22. 550 F.2d at 126.
23. 438 U.S. at 447-59.
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Court affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment, holding that the con-
victions could not stand because the trial judge had improperly in-
structed the jury on the crucial issue of intent." Speaking for the
majority, Chief Justice Burger expressed the Court's unwillingness
to construe the Sherman Act as providing for a "regime" of strict
liability crimes.25 He noted that "intent generally remains an indis-
pensible element of a criminal offense," and that this "is as true in
a sophisticated criminal antitrust case as in one involving any
other criminal offense. ' 26 The Chief Justice cited Morrisette v.
United States27 for the proposition that "at least with regard to
crimes having their origin in the common law, [there is] an inter-
pretative presumption that mens rea is required."28 Although he
recognized that strict liability offenses are not unknown to the
criminal law,29 the Chief Justice stated: "[Flar more than the sim-
ple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory defini-
tion is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent
requirement." -0
The Chief Justice then launched the discussion that has led,
at least in part, to the appellate court decisions"1 which have held
that intent is not a required element of proof for per se. violations
of section 1:
With certain exceptions for conduct regarded as per se illegal be-
cause of its unquestionably anticompetitive effects, see, e.g.,
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the
behavior proscribed by the Act is often difficult to distinguish
from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifi-
able business conduct .... The imposition of criminal liability
on a corporate official ... for engaging in such conduct which
only after the fact is determined to violate the statute because of
anticompetitve effects, without inquiring into the intent with
which it was undertaken, holds out the distinct possibility of
24. The Court also held that the verdict could not stand for two other reasons stated
by the Third Circuit. First, there had been an improper ex parte communication between
the trial judge and.the foreman of the jury, id. at 459-62, and second, the trial judge's in-
structions regarding withdrawal from the conspiracy were improper. Id. at 462-65.
25. Id. at 436.
26. Id. at 437.
27. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
28. 438 U.S. at 437.
29. Id. See generally W. LA FAvE & AL Scorr, CRImNA LAW 222-23 (1972).
30. 438 U.S. at 438.
31. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
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overdeterrence .... 12
Relying on this language from Gypsum, the Third Circuit, in
United States v. Gillen,3 3 upheld a conviction for conspiracy to fix
prices despite the fact that the trial judge, sitting without a jury,
failed to make a specific finding regarding intent. 4 The Gillen
court expressed the belief that "the Supreme Court's statement in
Gypsum on intent was born out of a concern for borderline viola-
tions and was not meant to modify past precedent on price fixing
conspiracies."' 3 5
Although an isolated reading of the quoted exerpt from the
Gypsum opinion might seem to support the Third Circuit's conclu-
sion, a careful reading of the entire decision supports the contrary
conclusion-that intent is an essential element of all criminal anti-
trust offenses.38 For example, the Supreme Court stated that "in-
tent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense ... and cannot
be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presump-
tion of wrongful intent ... .,8 The Supreme Court did not imply
that any criminal antitrust offenses should be excused from its
holding." Rather it stated unequivocally that "the criminal of-
fenses defined by the Sherman Act should be construed as includ-
ing intent as an element."3 9
The Third Circuit in Gillen gave misplaced importance to
Chief Justice Burger's reference to United States v. Socony-Vac-
uum Oil Co.,40 an earlier price fixing case, when it stated that the
Supreme Court in Gypsum "did not intend any extraordinary
change in the rules of law on price-fixing cases because by its very
32. 438 U.S. at 440-41.
33. 599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
34. Gypsum was decided one week after the trial judge in Gillen filed his Memoran-
dum of Decision containing findings of fact and a verdict of guilty. On appeal, the Third
Circuit stated: "We miust nevertheless consider Gypsum because we must apply the law in
effect as of the time we render this decision." 599 F.2d at 543.
35. Id. at 544.
36. See Note, Gypsum Intent and Felonious Conspiracies Under Section I of the
Sherman Act: U.S. v. Gillen, 82 W. VA. L. Rv. 371, 380 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gillen
Note].
37. 438 U.S. at 435.
38. Gilhn Note, supra note 36, at 380 (citing United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541,
548 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979)).
39. 438 U.S. at 443. The use of the signal "e.g." before the cite to Socony-Vacuum
tends to indicate that the Court merely intended to offer an example of a case involving
per se violation. It does not indicate that the Court intended to dispense with proof o:
intent in per se cases.
40. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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citation of Socony-Vacuum the Court acknowledged that price-
fixing cases are an exception."4 The Third Circuit then errone-
ously concluded: "[Iln price-fixing conspiracies, where conduct is
illegal per se, no inquiry has to be made on the issue of intent
beyond proof that one joined or formed the conspiracy." 42
Substantially the same language was used to sustain a convic-
tion for bid-rigging in United States v. Brighton Building & Main-
tenance Co. 43 Similarly, the court in United States v. Continental
Group, Inc.44 cited Gillen as controlling on the issue of intent
while sustaining a conviction for price fixing.45 An analysis of the
significance of these decisions, including their potential for misap-
plication in the future, necessarily must begin with an examination
of the per se concept.
Historical Development of the Per Se Concept
From the birth of the federal antitrust laws in 1890, strong
forces have pressed for some automatic or per se rules of antitrust
liability.4 These forces have combined over the years to contribute
to the development of judicial rulings that certain specified prac-
tices are per se unlawful under the antitrust laws. 47 None of the
modern per se categories could have emerged, however, before the
landmark decision of Standard Oil Co. v. United States48 in 1911.
In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court formulated the "rule of
41. 559 F.2d at 544.
42. Id. at 545.
43. 598 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979). The court stated:
"There is a difference, however, between the case before the Supreme Court in Gypsum and
the case before us. We consider the difference significant .... The conduct directly proved
in Gypsum, the practice of price verification, was not per se unlawful.... A conspiracy to
submit collusive, non-competitive, rigged bids is a per se violation of the statute. . . . We
conclude that the issue of intent was adequately submitted here where the court instructed
that, in order to convict it must be proved that defendants knowingly agreed or formed a
combination or conspiracy for the purpose of rigging the bids, and intentionally assisted in
its furtherance."
44. 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
45. "Because we believe that Gillen controls this case, the inquiry becomes whether
the district court adequately instructed the jury that the government had to prove that
defendants knowingly joined or formed a conspiracy to raise, fix, stabilize or maintain
prices. Accord, United States v. Brighton Building & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101, 1106
(7th Cir. 1979)." 603 F.2d at 462.
46. J VAN CxsE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTrRUST LAws 154 (1976).
47. Id. at 154-55.
48. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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reason" test for Sherman Act liability.4 Recognizing that only un-
reasonable restraints of trade are illegal, the Court held that "the
standard of reason which had been applied at common law . . .
was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determin-
ing whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought
about the wrong against which the statute provided." 50 Signifi-
cantly, the Court then went on to distinguish, rather than overrule,
several of its earlier decisions5' which did not discuss the reasona-
bleness of the alleged violation.5 In so doing, the Court foreshad-
owed the advent of the per se doctrine.
Sixteen years after Standard Oil the per se doctrine made its
initial appearance in the case of United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co.' s The defendants in Trenton Potteries were charged
under section 1 with conspiracy to fix and maintain uniform prices
for the sale of bathroom fixtures. The trial judge instructed the
jury that if it found the agreements or combinations complained
of, it might return a verdict without regard to the reasonableness
of the price fixed." The Second Circuit reversed, finding error in
the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury that only undue and
unreasonable restraints of trade are unlawful. 5 The Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the jury instruction
given by the trial court, thereby establishing price fixing as the
first per se violation of section 1.
Since the Trenton Potteries decision in 1927, at least four
more per se categories have been recognized, the exact number va-
rying from commentator to commentator. 5 A major reason for the
49. The rule of reason is commonly understood to be applicable only when a per se
violation is not involved. Properly understood, however, the rule was developed as a means
of testing the reasonableness of all restraints, including those instances in which the rule
mandates that a particular restraint is of a type that is per se prohibited. J. VON KALnNOW-
SKI, 16 BusIEssS ORGANIZATIONs-ANTrrRusT LAws AND TRADE REGULATION § 6.02[1][b]
(1980).
50. 221 U.S. at 60.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffc Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
52. 221 U.S. at 63-70.
53. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
54. Id. at 395.
55. Id. at 395-96.
56. See, e.g., S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws: CASES AND COm-
MENTS 18 (3d ed. 1968) (listing (1) price fixing agreements among competitors, (2) agree-
ments to limit production, (3) agreements to divide markets, (4) resale price maintenance
agreements with distributors, and (5) group boycotts); J. VoN KALINowSKI, BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS-ANTITRUST LAwS AND TRADE REGULATION § 6.02[3][a] (1980) (listing (1) vertical
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disagreement among writers who have addressed the issue is that
the Court has never purported to catalogue exhaustively the recog-
nized categories of per se violations.57 With little definitive gui-
dance, lower courts are left with an enormous amount of discretion
to fit novel factual circumstances into existing per se categories. 58
Closely related to the problem of imprecise categorization is
the problem of inconsistent application.5 9 It is significant to note
that every practice that has been singled out for per se condemna-
tion has at one time or another, been upheld as lawful under the
antitrust laws.60 In the words of a leading commentator "[t]he doc-
and horizontal price fixing, (2) tying arrangements, (3) vertical and horizontal boycotts, (4)
vertical and horizontal divisions of markets, and (5) reciprocal dealings); Flittie, The Sher-
man Act § 1 Per Se-There Ought to Be a Better Way, 30 Sw. L.J. 523, 530 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Flittie] (listing (1) price fixing agreements, (2) agreements to limit supply or
production, (3) horizontal territorial restrictions, (4) vertical territorial and customer restric-
tions where title has been passed from the supplier, (5) group boycotts, and (6) tying). Each
of these writers determined their respective categories before the 1977 decision of Continen-
tal T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)), which held that vertical territorial and customer re-
strictions are not illegal per se. For a discussion of the GTE decision, see text accompanying
notes 62-67 infra.
57. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the Supreme Court
identified tying, division of markets, group boycotts, horizontal and vertical price fixing, and
horizontal territorial restrictions as per se illegal. Id. at 259-60. However, the somewhat cas-
ual manner in which these categories were listed militates against their elevation to the level
of judicial dicta cataloguing all per se violations. See Flittie, supra note 56, at 530.
58. Compounding this definitional problem is the existence of certain offenses, such as
tying arrangements, which have been subjected to a limited rule of reason analysis even
after being labeled per se violations. Tying arrangements are agreements by a party to sell
one product only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different "tied" product,
or at least that he or she will not purchase the tied product from another seller. Although
the Supreme Court clearly marked tying arrangements as illegal per se in the cases of
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958), even proponents of the per se
approach have indicated that such arrangements should not be subject to the same inflexi-
bility as other per se categories. One set of commentators, for example, has said that tying
arrangements can best be described as "nearly" per se offenses. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
ANTRusT POLICY 144 (1959). This rather weak characterization appeared one year after the
decision in Northern Pacific and indicates that even the Supreme Court cannot by labels
convert what is actually a limited rule of reason analysis into an absolute test. See Flittie,
supra note 57, at 531.
59. For a review of cases demonstrating this lack of consistency in each of the major
per se categories, see Flittie, supra note 56, at 530-48.
60. J. VAN CISE, UNDIMSTAtNINo THE ANTITRUST LAWS 158 (1976). See, e.g., Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (price fixing); United States v. Morgan,
118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (same); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S.
344 (1933) (agreement to limit supply); National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United
States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923) (division of markets); United States v. National Football League,
.116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (same); Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign
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trine that a per se offense can 'never' be justified [has] to be quali-
fied-as by the Captain of the Pinafore-with 'hardly ever."' 61
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court will never re-
treat from an established per se category. Indeed, as the recent rul-
ing in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.6 2 demonstrates,
the Court is not totally adverse upon reconsideration to aban-
doning per se treatment for some offenses. Unfortunately, the GTE
case also demonstrates how qualifying language can rob a decision
of much of its force and effect.
The issue in GTE Sylvania was the viability of United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.," which held that vertical territorial and
customer restrictions" were per se violative of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The Court in GTE Sylvania, held that "the per se
rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled" ' and concluded that
"the appropriate decision is to return to the rule of reason that
governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn."66 However, the
Court refused to close the door on the issue, stating: "we do not
foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical re-
strictions might justify per se prohibition . . . .But we do make
clear that departure from the rule-of-reason standard must- be
based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than-as in
Schwinn-upon formalistic line drawing.
'6 7
The Court's admonition against "formalistic line drawing" is
questionable in light of its decision in United States v. Topco As-
Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.) (group boycotts), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952);
Mogul v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (same), aff'd mem., 527
F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1976); Sum of Squares, Inc. v. Market Research Corp. of America, 401 F.
Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962) (tying
arrangement); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (same), affl'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam).
61. J. VAN CISE, UNDRSTANDING THE AN RUST LAWS 158 (1976) (quoting from
H.M.S. Pinafore by W.S. Gilbert & Sir Arthur Sullivan).
62. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
63. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
64. Vertical restrictions are restraints on distribution imposed by a seller (e.g., manu-
facturer), operating at one end of a particular industry, upon buyers (e.g., retailers) at a
lower level of that same industry. In contrast, horizontal restrictions are restraints on distri-
bution among sellers competing at the same level of distribution. See, e.g., United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (discussed at notes 68-77 & accompanying text
infra).
65. 433 U.S. at 58.
66. Id. at 59.
67. Id. at 58-59.
[Vol. 32
sociates, Inc.,e8 four years before GTE Sylvania. In Topco, the
Court steadfastly adhered to an established per se category and
yet, at the same time, refused to deny that the conduct in question
was not only reasonable but served to promote competition. The
defendant in Topco was a cooperative association comprising
twenty-five small and medium-sized regional supermarket chains
operating in thirty-three states."9 Founded in 1940, the goal of
Topco Associates was to obtain high quality staple items of grocery
stock under its own label in order to compete more effectively with
larger national and regional chains. At the time of trial, the total
sales of Topco Associates were less than any one of the three larg-
est chains.70
In an effort to maintain the reputation and resulting business
advantage that Topco had built up through costly promotion and
quality control, the association restricted access to Topco-branded
items in such a way that each of its twenty-five members was given
an exclusive territory and was the only seller to have access to
Topco-branded merchandise in that area.7 1 No attempt to fix
prices was alleged.
The government maintained that this horizontal division of
markets violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because it operated
to prohibit competition in Topco-branded products among retail
grocery chains.72 The district court disagreed and found that the
intrabrand restraint was far outweighed "by the increased ability
of Topco members to compete both with the national chains and
other supermarkets operating in their respective territories. 7 3
The Supreme Court, on direct appeal from the district court,74
did not disagree that the actions of Topco Associates may have
created a net competitive advantage. Nevertheless, they reversed
the district court's decision solely on the grounds that a previous
case had already determined that horizontal territorial restrictions
were illegal per se.7 5 The Court went on to acknowledge an inher-
68. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
69. Id. at 598.
70. Id. at 600.
71. Id. at 602.
72. Id. at 603.
73. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1043 (N.D. Ial. 1970).
74. Direct appeal was taken pursuant to § 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29(b)
(1976).
75. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Chief Justice Burger, dissent-
ing in Topco, disagreed that Sealy had already classified horizontal territorial restraints as
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ent weakness of the per se approach in a statement that has been
said to contain "awesome adverse implications to the maintenance
of the competitive economy which is supposed to be the objective
of the Sherman Act.""
Whether or not we would decide this case in the same way under
-the rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant to the
issue before us. The fact is that courts are of limited utility in
examining difficult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in
any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of
the economy against promotion of competition in another sector
is one important reason we have formulated per se rules.7
This statement is awesome not only in its economic implications
but also in its potential effect on defendants in section 1 criminal
prosecutions. Under the reasoning of Topco, a defendant could
conceivably be convicted of a felony simply because the court
wanted to avoid confronting "difficult economic problems."
Attempts to justify the per se rules based on the inability of
courts to make difficult economic decisions are logically self-de-
feating. Given its admitted lack of expertise, how does the Court
gain the even greater expertise needed to establish a per se rule in
the first place, thereby precluding reasonable inquiry for the indef-
inite future?78 Furthermore, current rule of reason situations are
undoubtedly just as difficult to analyze as current per se fact situa-
tions would be if left to a rule of reason analysis.7 9 Lack of eco-
nomic expertise thus is an unsatisfactory reason for the application
of per se rules.
Equally unsatisfactory are the two other common justifications
for the per se doctrine: certainty of result and judicial economy.80
The inequitable result in Topco is probably sufficient, in and of
per se violations, noting that Sealy contained elements of the per se violation of price fixing.
608 U.S. at 616 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
76. Flittie, supra note 56, at 526 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958), and Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 469-93 (1940)).
77. 405 U.S. at 609-10.
78. Flittie, supra note 56, at 549. The dissenting circuit court judge in GTE Sylvania
raised a similar question, stating: "I am puzzled by the notion that because the courts are
not very well equipped to decide between conflicting notions of economic policy, they should
pick one side of such an argument and erect it into a rule of per se illegality." GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1030 (9th Cir. 1976) (Duniway, J., dissent-
ing), affd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
79. Flittie, supra note 56, at 549.
80. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Jacobi v. Bache
& Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1238 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976).
[Vol. 32
itself, to demonstrate that certainty of result is not a valid justifi-
cation for the per se rules. Further evidence, however, can be
found at the opposite end of the spectrum-in the cases in which
exceptions to the per se categories were recognized.81 These cases
lend support to the proposition that results are "certain" only
when the court decides not to find an exception.
The second justification for the per se rules, judicial economy,
loses much of its appeal when it is recognized that the reason the
per se categories are riddled with exceptions is that the federal dis-
trict courts do develop evidentiary records and do find merit in the
arguments of many defendants.82 These exceptions, coupled with
the Supreme Court's inconsistent conduct in defining and main-
taining per se categories make the judicial economy argument
much less persuasive.
The fate of a criminal antitrust defendant should not be made
to depend on a concept so replete with problems as the per se
rules. To allow the Gypsum requirement of proof of intent to be
avoided by attaching the label of per se to a particular offense in a
given case is to open the door, if only slightly, to the possibility
that formal rules, and not the substantive facts of a case, will be
used to obtain a guilty verdict.88 Admittedly, in many cases involv-
81. See cases cited in note 60 supra.
82. See cases cited in note 60 supra.
83. Professor Handler has suggested "it is inconceivable that those who engage in con-
duct so pernicious that it is 'conclusively presumed to be unreasonable' would not know the
probable effects of their actions." Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 1363, 1399-
1400 (1978) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). Justice Ste-
vens, concurring in part and dissenting in part in the Gypsum decision, expressed a similar
view: "There is, of course, a theoretical possibility that defendants could engage in a prac-
tice of exchanging current price information that was sufficiently prevalent to have
marketwide impact that they did not know about, but as a practical matter that possibility
is surely remote." 438 U.S. at 475 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Nevertheless
Donald Baker, former Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, has observed: "Occasionally defendants engage in per se price fixing,
but their conduct clearly indicates that they had no idea they were violating the antitrust
laws. There may, for instance, have been open and widely advertised public meetings among
a group of naive businessmen without an antitrust counsel." Baker, To Indict or Not to
Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNLL L. REv. 405,
417 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Baker]. See, e.g., United States v. Wholesale Tobacco Dis-
tribs., Inc., Crim. No. 77-131 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 17, 1977).
Although Mr. Baker felt that in cases where the evidence shows that the defendants did
not appreciate the consequences of their actions the bringing of criminal charges might be
inappropriate, he did indicate that the decision whether or not to prosecute criminally was
completely within the prosecutor's discretion. Baker, supra, at 417-18. See note 100 infra.
Thus, it remains entirely possible for a defendant to be criminally tried for price fixing
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ing per se violations, an instruction on intent will be a mere for-
mality imposing a burden on the prosecution that can readily be
met. 4 In such cases, the new test may be only verbally different
from the old one. 5 However, it is crucial to recognize that simply
because at some time in the past the Supreme Court designated an
offense as a per se violation does not mean that a specific finding
of intent will necessarily be superfluous or that the requirement of
such a finding should be abandoned.
Nevertheless, eleven months after Gypsum, the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Brighton Building & Maintenance Co.,8"
indicated that proof of intent could be dispensed with when it ac-
knowledged the government's contention that "'since the per se
rules define types of restraints that are illegal without further in-
quiry into their competitive reasonableness, they are substantive
rules of law, not evidentary presumptions. It is as if the Sherman
Act read: "An agreement among competitors to rig bids is ille-
gal." ",87 Such an argument could well serve as the formula that
turns all per se violations into strict liability offense once the ini-
tial- conspiracy is shown.8 The courts need only insert the appro-
priate per se rule into the equation and it will be as if the Sherman
Act read: "tying arrangements, or group boycotts, or horizontal
territorial restrictions among competitors are illegal." The flaw in
this argument is that the per se rules are neither sufficiently con-
sistent nor logically sound enough to be read into the Sherman Act
in such a way. The Court in Gypsum pronounced that the Sher-
man Act was not intended to create strict liability crimes, 9 and
proof of intent should not be avoidable by implying new language
notwithstanding his or her lack of criminal intent. Once it is recognized that a person can
innocently become involved in price fixing, the most flagrant of all the per se offenses, it is
easy to see how they could unintentionally violate one of the more ambiguous per se rules.
84. Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1399 (1978).
85. Id. at 1400.
86. 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979).
87. Id. at 1106.
88. In a conspiracy, two different types of intent must generally be shown. First, the
basic intent to agree is necessary to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Second, the
more traditional intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy must be proved. The focus
of the Gypsum decision was on the latter type of intent. 438 U.S. at 443 n.20.
Although this distinction was expressly recognized by the courts in Gillen, Brighton,
and Continental, those courts reasoned that because they were dealing with per se offenses,
only the first type of intent had to be proved. For a further discussion of the required degree
of intent in § 1 conspiracies, see notes 107-114 & accompanying text infra.
89. 438 U.S. at 436. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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into the Act."°
The Sherman Act as a Criminal Statute
As both a civil and a criminal statute, the Sherman Act is re-
nowned for both its breadth and its brevity.91 The flexibility of the
Act allows it to reach ever changing business conduct, including
schemes never envisioned by its framers.9 2 This adaptability, how-
ever, is also its primary weakness, for "in its role as a criminal stat-
ute, the Act cannot provide the specific definitions typically associ-
ated with penal codes."98
Although the general language of the Sherman Act has with-
stood constitutional challenges for vagueness,94 the definitional
problem has persisted. One attempt to add some clarity to the role
of the Sherman Act as a criminal statute was the recommendation
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws in 1955: "[W]e believe that criminal process should be
used only where the law is clear and the facts reveal a flagrant
offense and plain intent unreasonably to restrain trade. '9 5 The An-
titrust Division of the Department of Justice, however, rejected the
committee's standards of "flagrant offense" and "plain intent" and
instead adopted a more moderate stance on criminal prosecu-
tions.9 Confusion persisted, however, and in 1967 the Antitrust
90. The recent amendment to the Sherman Act increasing the criminal penalties for
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act adds further strength to the contention that the Gyp-
sum mandate of proof of intent should be applicable in all § 1 criminal prosecutions. See
notes 101-18 & accompanying text infra.
91. See Baker, supra note 83, at 405.
92. Note, United States v. United States Gypsum Co.: Putting a Lid on Container,
45 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 417, 422 (1979).
93. Id. Senator Sherman himself evidently recognized this definitional problem when
he opposed the inclusion of a criminal provision in the Act during congressional debates.
See P. HADLICK, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 19-20 (1939).
94. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1913) (upholding misdemeanor
provisions of the Sherman Act); Jack Foley Realty, Inc., 1977-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61, 678
(D. Md. July 29, 1977) (upholding felony provisions). Significantly, however, both Nash and
Jack Foley dealt with price fixing, the setting in which the Sherman Act prohibition is least
vulnerable to vagueness challenges. Baker, supra note 83 at 409 n.23.
95. THE ATTY. GENERAL'S NATIONAL ComIoTTE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, RE-
PORT 349 (1955).
96. The Antitrust Division's guidelines provided: "In general, the following types of
offenses are prosecuted criminally. (1) price fixing; (2) other violations of the Sherman Act
where there is proof of a specific intent to restrain trade or to monopolize; (3) a less easily
defined category of cases which might generally be described as involving proof of use of
predatory practices (boycotts, for example) to accomplish the objective of the combination
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Division refined its earlier guidelines:
[C]riminal prosecutions will be recommended to the Attorney
General only against willful violations of the law, and... one of
the two conditions must appear to be shown to establish willful-
ness. First, if the rules of law alleged to have been violated are
clear and established-describing per se offenses-willfulness will
be presumed .... Second, if the acts of the defendants show
intentional violation-through circumstantial evidence or direct
testimony it appears that the defendants knew they were violat-
ing the law or were acting with flagrant disregard for the legality
of their conduct-willfulness will be presumed.9 7
It was against this background that the Gypsum Court re-
versed the long line of cases holding that the Sherman Act had the
"same substantive reach in criminal and civil cases, ' 'ss and im-
posed the requirement that evidence establish that criminal defen-
dants acted willfully or knowingly. Although the 1967 report of the
President's Commission was referred to in a footnote by the Su-
preme Court,99 nowhere in the Gypsum decision does the Court
mention that such a "presumption of willfulness" in per se cases
would be carried beyond the initial decision to prosecute and into
the trial itself.100
or conspiracy; (4) the fact that a defendant has previously been convicted of or adjudged to
have been, violating the antitrust laws may warrant indictment for a second offense. There
are other factors taken into account in determining whether to seek an indictment in any
cases that may not fall precisely in any of these categories. The Division feels free to seek an
indictment in any case where a prospective defendant has knowledge that practices similar
to those in which he is engaging have been held to be in violation of the Sherman Act in a
prior civil suit against other persons." Id. at 350 (statement of Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant
Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division).
97. THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT. CRIME AND ITS IMPAT-AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967) (footnote
omitted).
98. 438 U.S. at 474 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. Id. at 440 n.15.
100. It is important to recognize that the guidelines set forth in the Attorney Gen-
eral's Commission Report of 1955, see note 95 & accompanying text supra, those asserted
by the Antitrust Division Report of 1955, see note 96 & accompanying text supra, and those
contained in the President's Task Force Report of 1967, see note 97 & accompanying text
supra, are directed to the question of whether or not to bring criminal charges and are in no
sense binding on the courts after an indictment has been sought and obtained. Thus, the
"presumption of willfulness" mentioned in the President's Task Force Report is not a direc-
tive to the courts but rather a recommendation to the Assistant Attorney General. Further-
more, because the guidelines are merely recommendations, the Assistant Attorney General
is free to accept or reject them at his or her discretion. Accordingly, former Assistant Attor-
ney General Baker has stated: "Articulation and consistent application of principles for
deciding the form of proceedings give parties some notice of the standards to which their
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Lending further support to the Gypsum Court's requirement
of intent and to the necessity of treating per se allegations the
same as other criminal antitrust charges is the 1974 amendment to
the Sherman Act.101 That amendment elevated section 1 offenses
from misdemeanors to felonies and increased maximum jail
sentences from one to three years. The amendment also increased
the maximum fines from $50,000 to $1,000,000 for corporations and
$100,000 for individuals. 102
One of the first decisions rendered after the 1974 amendment
was United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc.,0 3 a district court opinion
decided one year prior to Gypsum. The defendants in Nu-Phonics
were a group of Detroit area hearing aid dealers charged with con-
spiracy to fix prices in violation of section 1. Before trial, the gov-
ernment moved-for exclusion of certain defense evidence claiming
that it was irrelevant because the offense charged was a per se vio-
lation of the Sherman Act and, therefore, inquiry into the reasona-
bleness of the defendants' conduct was precluded.
In granting portions of the government's motion in limine, the
court "felt bound by existing Sherman Act law." 104 At the same
time, however, the court ventured that the recent amendment to
the Sherman Act "warrants careful re-evaluation of the nature of
proof that until 1974 had been thought sufficient to establish the
offense." 10 5 Foreshadowing the holding in Gypsum the court con-
cluded: "In light of the change in the Sherman Act violation, the
settled Sherman Act law of mens rea and overt acts deserve
reconsideration."106
The Nu-Phonics court suggested that the Sherman Act should
require the same elements of proof as the general conspiracy stat-
ute in the federal criminal code.1 07 After Gypsum, several commen-
conduct will be held. Ultimately, however, these hard choices require judgment calls by the
Assistant Attorney General. All we can ask is that in making such calls he be fair, candid
and dispassionate." Baker, supra note 83, at 418.
101. See text accompanying note 90 supra. The Gypsum defendants were not prose-
cuted under the new penalty provisions because they were indicted prior to December 21,
1974, the effective date of the increased sanctions. 438 U.S. at 442 n.18.
102. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706
(1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
103. 443 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
104. Id. at 1015.
105. Id. at 1014.
106. Id. at 1015.
107. Id. The conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), requires proof of specific in-
tent for a felony conspiracy conviction. See generally United States v. Fola, 420 U.S. 671,
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tators0 s have echoed this suggestion, pointing out that although
the Supreme Court in Gypsum directly rejected the argument that
specific intent must be shown to sustain misdemeanor convictions
under the antitrust laws,109 the same cannot be said of felony con-
victions because the 1974 amendment did not apply to that case.110
They argue that "knowledge of probable consequences" as re-
quired by Gypsum is not enough, and that specific intent to re-
strain trade should be a required element of proof.111
Essentially the same argument was advanced on appeal by the
defendants in United States v. Foley.1 2 The Foley case differed
from Gillen, Brighton, and Continental in that the instructions on
intent give by the trial judge undoubtedly satisfied Gypsum.11 3 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions stating: "In in-
creasing the penalties for violating § 1 and redefining the offense as
a felony, Congress did not intend to change the elements of the
offense .... We consider the Gypsum rule, so far as statutory in-
terpretation is concerned, still to apply to § 1 offenses. 11 4 Whether
or not Gypsum's standard of intent is inadequate for current fel-
ony prosecutions is at least open to question. What does not seem
686 (1975).
108. See, e.g., Gillen Note, supra note 36, at 376-77; Note, Mens Rea and Felony Vio-
lations Under the Sherman Act, 11 Loy. Cm. L.J. 161, 174-77 (1980).
109. Rejection of a specific intent requirement in Gypsum was made evident when the
court stated that "[a] requirement of proof not only of this knowledge of likely effects, but
also of a conscious desire to bring them to fruition or to violate the law would seem, particu-
larly in such a context, both unnecessarily cumulative and unduly burdensome." 438 U.S. at
446.
110. See note 101 supra.
111. See Gillen Note, supra note 36, at 377-78; Note, Mens Rea and Felony Violations
Under the Sherman Act, 11 Loy. CHI. L.J. 176-77 (1980).
112. 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980).
113. The trial judge's instruction on intent provided essentially that the jury "must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants must have known that their agreement, if
effectuated, would have an effect on prices; that they knowingly joined in a conspiracy
whose purpose was to fix prices; and that in joining they intended to further that purpose."
598 F.2d at 1336.
The proposed jury instruction submitted by the defendants read as follows: "The in-
dictment in this case charges a serious crime which requires proof of specific intent before a
defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than a general
intent to commit an illegal act or to make an illegal statement. To establish specific intent
in this case, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knowingly did act or made statements purposely intending thereby to violate the antitrust
law by fixing commission rates on listings of residential property. Such intent must be de-
termined from all the facts and circumstances which you find from the evidence occurred."
Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 3 (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
114. 598 F.2d at 1335.
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open to question is that Gypsum sets forth a minimum standard
requiring intent to be proven "by evidence and inferences," 115 not
merely presumed.
A final observation is worth noting with regard to the 1974
amendment to section 1. Analysis of the history of the Sherman
Act prior to 1974 reveals comparatively few periods of active crimi-
nal prosecutions, as opposed to civil litigation.116 Since the 1974
amendment to the Sherman Act, however, a marked charge in atti-
tude has taken place at the Justice Department. On May 5, 1977,
Donald Baker, then Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the
Antitrust Division, announced a thirty percent increase in the
number of pending antitrust grand juries since the enactment of
the 1974 amendment.1 17 He made clear that this was an "affirma-
tive choice" designed to make maximum use of the Sherman Act
felony standards enacted by Congress.1 " There has been no indica-
tion that the current Antitrust Division, under the leadership of
John Shenefield, will slow this trend.
This shift in attitude by the Antitrust Division emphasizes the
need for caution in the application of evidentiary shortcuts such as
the per se rules. With felony convictions and prison sentences
emerging as real possibilities for section 1 violations, the rights ac-
corded an accused violator of the Sherman Act should be no less
than the right accorded any other accused felon.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to clarify its holding
in Gypsum, outlining precisely the degree of intent necessary to
find a section 1 violation and defining the role, if any, of the per se
rules in making that determination. In the meantime, lower courts
apparently remain free to utilize the per se rules as a shortcut to
conviction.
Conclusion
The Gypsum decision established that intent is a required ele-
115. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
116. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 30-43 (1976); Posner, A
Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 385 (1970).
117. Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement: Hearings on the Oversight of 4ntitrust En-
forcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department's Antitrust Divi-
sion Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 340 (1977) (statement of Donald I. Baker).
118. Id.
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ment of proof in criminal antitrust prosecutions. The two-pronged
Gypsum test for measuring intent is not a difficult one for the gov-
ernment to satisfy, particularly when anticompetitive consequences
have been demonstrated. At worst, total compliance with the Gyp-
sum standard will result in the slight extension of a trial that has
already lasted weeks or months. At best, it could mean the differ-
ence between conviction and acquittal.
No justifiable reason exists for allowing the rights of an ac-
cused felon to be subject to the possibility of abridgement by a
concept such as the per se rules. The per se rules were developed
to provide standards, for the courts and for potential violators of
the Sherman Act, as well as to lend consistency to decisions and to
furnish some measure of judicial economy. Whether or not it has
succeeded on any of these counts is a matter of some debate.119
Regardless of its historical efficacy in establishing the objective un-
reasonableness of particular conduct, however, the per se rules
should not, after Gypsum, be used to shortcut proof of subjective
intent in criminal antitrust cases.
Knowledge of probable anticompetitive consequences'" at a
minimum should now be shown in addition to the required show-
ing of an unreasonable restraint of trade.121 Merely because unrea-
sonableness has ostensibly been established by the operation of a
per se rule does not mean that intent has also been demonstrated.
Finally, underlying this entire discussion is the consideration that
convicted violators of section 1 will be guilty not of misdemeanors,
but of felonies. This distinction is perhaps the most important rea-
son why a finding of intent, as prescribed by Gypsum, should be
mandatory in all criminal antitrust prosecutions.
119. See notes 78-82 & accompanying text supra.
120. This standard is applicable when anticompetitive results have been shown.
Where no anticompetitive effects have been demonstrated, the elevated standard of "con-
scious purpose" must be satisfied.
121. For a discussion of the appropriateness of requiring "conscious purpose" rather
than merely "knowledge of probable consequences," regardless of whether anticompetitive
effects have been demonstrated, see notes 107-114 & accompanying text supra.
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